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INTRODUCTION 
American civil procedure is in the fourth era of its history.1 Interestingly, 
the set of procedural rules that launched the third era—the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure2—are still formally intact in the fourth era.3 Yet, sadly in my 
view, waves of profound, correlated, and enduring reforms engulfed the core 
values of those Federal Rules, thereby establishing de facto the current, fourth 
era.4 
                                                        
*  William S. Boyd Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Neva-
da, Las Vegas. Thanks to Stephen Subrin, Jeffrey Stempel, David McClure, and Greg 
Pingree. 
1  See generally Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil 
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014). 
2  For history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1050–98 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Per-
spective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 948–56 (1987). 
3  See FED. R. CIV. P. 
4  See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1841–56. 
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Although my desire is to escape the clutches of a wayward fourth era, my 
research agenda focuses on the history of the transition from the third era to the 
fourth. I hope that a better understanding of that transition—which occurred in-
crementally in the 1970s and 1980s5—will shed light on how best to structure 
reforms that may ultimately usher in a new, fifth era. 
Because I am partial to the values of the third era, I imagine a fifth era that 
resembles the third. The third era was premised on the notion that, once the par-
ties learned the relevant facts, cases would either settle or go to trial.6 Judges 
had a limited but important role in this process: (1) ensure that both parties had 
access to all relevant facts; and (2) for those cases that did not settle, preside 
over a trial.7 Judges had very limited authority to dismiss the case prior to the 
discovery of relevant facts, and judges would rarely enter a summary judg-
ment.8 Judges tried cases.9 And most cases settled.10 
The fourth era was established through a number of reforms, most of which 
were initiated by judges through new interpretations of extant rules.11 Experi-
encing something of a role reversal, judges in the fourth era play a significant 
role at each stage of litigation except for trials.12 Indeed, trials have all but dis-
appeared.13 Instead, in the fourth era: (1) the motion to dismiss has a screening 
function that terminates some cases (and chills others),14 (2) the discovery stage 
is harder to reach, and broad discovery harder to obtain,15 and (3) the summary 
                                                        
5  See id. at 1847–56. 
6  See Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL, 
at iii (1932); Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE 
L.J. 863, 864 (1933); see also Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1845–46. See generally John 
H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522 
(2012). 
7  See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1845–46. 
8  JOE S. CECIL & C.R. DOUGLAS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE IN THREE DISTRICT COURTS 
1 (1987); Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 
141, 147 (2000); Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1845. 
9  See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1845. 
10  See id. at 1846 (“Nearly all of the remaining cases were resolved by settlement. When the 
parties settled, it was because both parties agreed that the settlement was preferable to the 
alternative. Importantly, the alternative was a trial . . . .”). See generally Marc Galanter & 
Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994); Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in 
the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162–64 (1986). 
11  See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1847–49, 1852–53, 1887. 
12  Id. at 1853, 1859–67. 
13  ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 12–13 (2001); Marc Galanter, The Van-
ishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462–63 tbl.1 (2004); Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1857 
n.94, 1875–76; William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitu-
tion, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 83 (2006). 
14  See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1848–49. 
15  Id. at 1849–51. 
Summer 2015] PROCEDURAL CONSTANTS 1599 
judgment motion is the “focal point” of litigation.16 In this regime, trial is a 
“mistake”;17 accordingly, judges are impelled to manage cases toward settle-
ment from the onset of litigation.18 As in the third era, most cases in the fourth 
era settle; but the important difference is that rather than cases setting in the 
shadow of a trial,19 they now settle in the shadow of a sword of Damocles.20 
                                                        
16  For references to summary judgment as the “focal point” of litigation, see Arthur R. Mil-
ler, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and 
Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 982, 1016 (2003); Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1852–53; Diane P. Wood, Summary 
Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 231, 240 
(2011). For a discussion of how summary judgment is increasingly the endpoint of litigation, 
see Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know Versus What We 
Ought to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 710 (2012) (stating that movants win 55 to 68 per-
cent of their summary judgments (citing Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort,  
Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Michael Baylson 1 (Apr. 12, 2007, rev. June 15, 2007),  
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf)); see 
also BARRETT & FARAHANY, LLP, ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS FOR 
CASES IN WHICH AN ORDER WAS ISSUED ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN 2011 AND 2012 IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 3, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326697 (reporting grant rates of 95 percent for partial 
summary judgments and 83 percent for full summary judgments). 
17  See generally Fred J. Cassibry, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in 
SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 271 (1971) (“Most of the 
time when I try a case I consider that I have somehow failed . . . . [T]he judge must not only 
explore settlement but must actively pursue it with all the vigor at his command . . . . [U]ntil 
every last road to settlement has been traveled, I will not try the case.”); Samuel R. Gross & 
Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) (stating “[t]rial is a disease, not generally fatal, but serious enough to be 
avoided at any reasonable cost” (footnote omitted)); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psy-
chological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
107, 107–08 (1994) (suggesting that most judges and scholars believe “trials represent mis-
takes—breakdowns in the bargaining process—that leave the litigants and society worse off 
than they would have been had settlement been reached”). See generally Judith Resnik, 
Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 261 n.200 (1995) (quoting Edward Cooper’s criticism of the prevail-
ing tendency to view a “trial as a pathological event” (citing Edward Cooper, Reports, 
Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 20 (October 21–23, 1993))). 
18  See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge’s Role, 61 
JUDICATURE 400 (1978); see also D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL 
DISTRICT JUDGES 93 (1986) (criticizing academics and praising “[s]ettlement-oriented judg-
es” who have a “fundamental commitment to enhancing settlement opportunities in the fed-
eral courts”). For criticism of this mindset, see Young, supra note 13, at 94 (collecting au-
thorities). 
19  See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE 
NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION (1991); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many 
Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981); 
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of 
Law and Fact in an Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981 
(2004). 
20  See supra note 13; see infra notes 131, 133–34 and accompanying text. 
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A dramatic increase in the civil caseload was a primary trigger (and the ar-
ticulated justification) for the reforms that instigated the fourth era.21 Between 
the 1960s and 1990s, Congress significantly expanded the scope of federal ju-
risdiction and created hundreds of new causes of action.22 In the three decades 
leading up to 1969, the civil caseloads of federal courts grew at a modest aver-
age annual rate of approximately 3.4 percent.23 But in the 1970s, the average 
annual rate of growth was 7.4 percent.24 From 1980 to 1985, the average annual 
rate of growth was 10.1 percent.25 (Since 1985, there has been essentially no 
growth.26) 
The burgeoning caseload was not ignored. First, there was a formal, institu-
tional response: on a number of occasions, Congress expanded the capacity of 
the federal courts by creating new judgeships.27 But increases in the number of 
judges did not match increases in the number of newly filed cases. For exam-
ple, between 1969 and 1983, a period during which the civil caseload more 
than tripled, the number of federal district judges increased by only 70 per-
cent.28 As a practical matter, then, the average civil caseload of each federal 
judge doubled over the course of a long decade: in 1969, there were an average 
of nineteen new civil filings per judge per month; and in 1983, that number had 
increased to forty.29 
Of course the judges themselves also responded to the dramatic increase in 
the number of cases; hence the fourth era.30 This response was institutional in 
the sense that it was implemented throughout the federal court system. Yet this 
                                                        
21  Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1859–67. 
22  Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 
III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 956 (2000) (citing Memorandum from the Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts, Revision of List of Statutes Enlarging Federal Court Workload (Sept. 18, 
1998) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)). 
23  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-1 (1940–1969) [hereinafter 
ANNUAL REPORTS]. 
24  Id. at tbl.C-1 (1970–1979). 
25  Id. at tbl.C-1 (1980–1985). 
26  See infra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
27  The numbers of authorized district court judgeships increased significantly in 1949, 1954, 
1961, 1966, 1970, 1978, 1984, 1990, 1999, 2000, and 2002. See Authorized Judgeships, U.S. 
CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/AuthorizedJudgeships.aspx. The Fed-
eral Magistrates Act of 1968 also increased the capacity of the district courts. See generally 
Philip M. Pro, United States Magistrate Judges: Present But Unaccounted For (Mar. 31, 
2014) (unpublished thesis, Duke University, School of Law) (on file with author); see also 
infra notes 59, 180 and accompanying text. 
28  ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-1 (1969–1983). 
29  Id. 
30  The reforms that ushered in the fourth era appeared on many fronts, including pleading, 
summary judgment, class actions, ADR, standing, fee awards, justiciability, access to courts, 
access to lawyers, and case management. To be clear, not all of the reforms were reinterpre-
tations of extant rules. There were some statutory reforms. There were also some reforms to 
the Federal Rules. See Subrin & Main, supra note 1. 
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was not a top-down reform that emanated from the Supreme Court. Although a 
number of the Court’s decisions signaled key moments in the establishment of 
the fourth era,31 the Court played more of a ratifying role, as opposed to a lead-
ing role.32 Instead, district court judges powered the engine of reform toward a 
new era of procedure that, among other things, transformed the role of a federal 
district judge.33 
Locating the source of reform in the district courts (née “trial” courts) is 
particularly intriguing for two reasons. First, it discourages wholly ideological 
explanations for the institutionalization of the fourth era.34 Although there are 
demonstrated political effects in Supreme Court decisionmaking,35 recent em-
pirical scholarship advises skepticism about the role of ideology at the trial 
court level.36 To be sure, a conservative and anti-law-enforcement ideology un-
                                                        
31  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (mandatory arbitration); 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (class actions); J. McIntyre Mach., 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (personal jurisdiction); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009) (pleading); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating civil remedies); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706 (1999) (Eleventh Amendment); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) (admissibility of evidence); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 
(1991) (mandatory arbitration); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (complex litigation); 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (personal jurisdic-
tion); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment); Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 
(1985) (fees); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). See Edward A. Pur-
cell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of 
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1742–47 (2014). 
32  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil 
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 620 
(2004) (noting the rise of summary judgments in the 1970s, prior to the Supreme Court’s 
trilogy of summary judgment cases in 1986); Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1848 (recount-
ing history of heightened pleading and describing how “[t]he Supreme Court, like a drum 
major whose band was no longer following, sprinted to get back in front of the parade and 
preserve the appearance of leadership”). 
33  Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1872–74, 1890–91. 
34  Cf. id. at 1861–67. 
35  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Ap-
proach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014). 
36  See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial 
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (finding that the judges’ 
political preferences do not affect the outcome of summary judgment motions in civil rights 
cases); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee 
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 840–41 (2010) (finding no effect of the judges’ 
political party on class action settlements and their fee awards); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., 
Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation 
in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 193 (2010) (finding 
that the “party of the deciding judge bears no relation to outcome”); see also Denise M. 
Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial 
Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 233 (2009) (suggesting that studies of political 
effects may be complicated by differences in judicial decision-making in published as op-
posed to unpublished opinions). 
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doubtedly played some role in launching and legitimizing the fourth era.37 Yet 
it would be easy to exaggerate the significance of that explanation since many 
of the fourth era reforms were introduced or enthusiastically adopted by district 
judges who were appointed by Democratic presidents.38 
Second, identifying the district courts as the engine of reform invites 
speculation about how a group of relatively diverse, geographically scattered, 
and fiercely independent federal judges adopted these reforms and assigned 
themselves this role. How did they mobilize? Who was their leader? When and 
why did they set this agenda? 
In this article, I demonstrate that the fourth era reforms were predictable in 
light of certain prevailing cultural norms of the district courts. These norms—
what I call procedural constants—are phenomena that can be measured statisti-
cally and have remained constant for decades.39 These procedural constants are 
not mandated by rule or statute, yet they have persisted amid otherwise remark-
ably dynamic circumstances. The strongest version of my thesis is that the 
fourth era reforms were path dependent. In other words, these reforms had no 
leader, and there was no mobilization effort, nor an agenda; instead, the proce-
dural constants foreclosed any course of action other than the one pursued. 
I divide the procedural constants into two clusters, but essentially every-
thing that I discuss regards the timing of cases entering and exiting the federal 
court’s civil docket. Part I unearths procedural constants from annual data re-
garding the number of filed cases, terminated cases, and pending cases. Part II 
reveals procedural constants that are embedded in annual data regarding the 
amount of time from filing to termination. In part III, I discuss how these pro-
cedural constants shaped reforms that led ineluctably to the fourth era. And part 
IV describes lawmaking efforts that bolstered the impromptu judicially-
initiated reforms. In the conclusion, I contemplate a new, fifth era. 
I. FILED CASES, TERMINATED CASES, AND PENDING CASES 
The key observations of this article are not about things that changed dur-
ing the dynamic transition from the third to the fourth eras, but rather about 
things that remained constant. In this part, I introduce the first two procedural 
constants: (i) the relationship between the number of terminations and the 
number of filings, and (ii) the size of the court’s docket of pending cases. 
                                                        
37  Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1869–72; see also Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civ-
il Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1235–36 (2015). 
38  Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1852 n.70, 1866. 
39  To be clear, what I label a procedural constant is really only a constant since about 1940 
(and in some instances, because of the limited data available, only since 1963). The late 
1930s was a critical moment in the construction of the modern identity of a system of federal 
courts—first with the promulgation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and then the Court’s 
articulation of the Erie Doctrine. See Rules of Civil Procedure, 308 U.S. 645 (1938); Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts was 
also established in 1939, and data prior to 1940 lacks certain indicia of reliability. 
Summer 2015] PROCEDURAL CONSTANTS 1603
A. Cases Terminated and Cases Filed 
The number of cases that are terminated40 in a given year tracks very close-
ly the number of cases that are filed that year. This is noteworthy since, over 
the course of the past seven decades, the federal courts have experienced signif-
icant changes including, inter alia, (i) the number of civil cases filed;41 (ii) the 
composition of the civil caseload;42 (iii) the size, makeup, infrastructure, and 
administrative management of the judiciary;43 and (iv) the perception about the 
proper role of courts.44 Yet, as Figure 1 below demonstrates, the close relation-
ship between the number of filings and the number of terminations has re-
mained constant for more than seventy years.45 The very close relationship be-
tween these two numbers is unmistakable; in the language of statistics, the 
coefficient of determination (r2 value) is 98.9 of a possible 100, and the average 
annual difference between the two numbers is about ± 5.1 percent.46 
FIGURE 1: CASES FILED AND CASES TERMINATED47 
                
40  For a much more sophisticated treatment of what constitutes a termination, see Moore, 
supra note 37, at 1198. 
41 Id. at 1208–38. 
42 Id. 
43 See generally DEBORAH J. BARROW ET AL., THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 11–24 (1996); John M. de Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control 
of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 
39 J.L. & ECON. 435 (1996); Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: 
Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171 
(1995). 
44 John M. de Figueiredo et al., Congress and the Political Expansion of the U.S. District 
Courts, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 107 (2000). 
45 Statistical data published before the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts was established 
suggest that this relationship may have been constant since the mid-1920s. In 1923, the 
number of filings and terminations were, respectively, 30,716 and 28,916—a difference of 
about 6 percent. In each of the ten years before 1923, however, the differentials were much 
more pronounced, ranging from a low of 11 percent to a high of 85 percent. From 1923 to 
1933, the percentage of difference never exceeded single digits. See ANNUAL REPORTS, su-
pra note 23, at tbl.C-1 (1923–1933). 
46 Id. at tbl.C-1 (1940–2013). 
47 Id. 
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Cases may terminate upon a court order following a trial, a motion for 
summary judgment, or a motion to dismiss. But more often, cases terminate by 
voluntary agreement of the parties.48 Voluntary settlements occur in the shadow 
of formal litigation,49 but the role of judges in generating these terminations is 
not altogether obvious; I will address this issue in the next subpart.50 
Although it may be intuitive that the number of terminations would or 
should closely track the number of newly-filed cases, it is neither necessary nor 
inevitable. To be sure, the total number of terminations cannot exceed the total 
number of filed cases. But the reverse is not true: terminations need not keep 
pace with the number of newly filed cases. If the number of terminations fell 
significantly behind the number of filings, the courts would accrue a growing 
inventory of pending cases. An inventory backlog could be addressed in leaner 
years or, absent that, structural delays would inevitably result. Large backlogs 
and long delays might be undesirable or even unjust,51 but they are undoubtedly 
possible. In fact, lay people (and experts who should know better) often speak 
as though backlogs and delays are endemic to civil litigation.52 Nevertheless, 
the close relationship between the number of filings and terminations each year 
is the first of several revelations in this paper regarding the federal judiciary’s 
especially strong aversion to delays and inventory backlogs. In fact, this aver-
                                                        
48  See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 10, at 1338–40. 
49  See generally KRITZER, supra note 19; Galanter, supra note 19; Mnookin & Kornhauser, 
supra note 19; Subrin & Main, supra note 19. 
50  See infra Part I.B. 
51  See generally Magna Carta, Cl. 40 (“To no one will we deny or delay right or justice.”); 
Thomas O. Main, Judicial Discretion to Condition, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1075, 1092 n.70 (2006) 
(citing authorities); David Schultz, “Justice Delayed, Justice Denied”: The Fastest Gun in 
the East (Or at Least on the Supreme Court), 16 CONST. COMMENT. 213, 213 (1999) (“ ‘Jus-
tice delayed, justice denied’ is an ancient legal maxim.”). 
52  See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal 
Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 765–67 (2010) (discussing changes to the Rules); Arthur 
R. Miller, McIntrye in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465, 477 
(2012) (recounting the cost and delay rhetoric from the late 1970s and early 1970s when he 
served as Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules); Moore, supra note 37, at 
1179 (“[L]itigants have their cases delayed for months and months because our Federal 
courts are understaffed.” (quoting The Federal Judgeship Act of 2013: Hearing on S. 1385 
Before the Subcomm. on Bankr. & the Courts. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 
30 (Sept. 10, 2013) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy))). Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-
Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 
1116–32 (2012) (offering extensive citations in a section titled “Explaining the Resilience of 
the Cost-and-Delay Narrative”). See generally Warren E. Burger, Preface to THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 5–6 (A. Leo Levin & Russell 
Wheeler eds., 1979) (articulating concerns about excessive delays in civil litigation); Edward 
H. Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspective, Address at Na-
tional Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice (Apr. 9, 1976), in POUND CONFERENCE, supra, at 269–70 (same); Leonard S. Janofsky, 
A.B.A. Attacks Delay and the High Cost of Litigation, 65 A.B.A. J. 1323, 1323 (1979) (de-
scribing the initiatives of the ABA’s Action Program to Reduce Court Costs and Delays). I 
will talk more about this in Part II. As a matter of fact, what is endemic are concerns about 
delays not delays. 
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sion to delay appears to be the animating force behind the procedural constants 
that, in turn, shape reform. 
Figure 1, above, demonstrated the dynamic conformity between the num-
ber of cases filed and the number of cases terminated each year. Figure 2, be-
low, presents that same data on a per-judge basis. 
FIGURE 2: CASES FILED AND CASES TERMINATED53 
Naturally, the appointment of new judges moderated the impact of the sev-
en-fold increase in the absolute number of new cases.54 Yet, even on a per-
judge basis, increases in the numbers of filings and terminations were signifi-
cant. 
The termination of a case is, essentially, a service that the judiciary pro-
vides. The courts are a shared public resource that provides a forum for the res-
olution of disputes. The system of procedural rules helps interrogate, investi-
gate, filter, focus, and resolve each of those disputes; and each termination is 
the product of some integration of law and fact.55 The data charted in Figure 2, 
above, suggest that the judiciary’s capacity to produce this service is remarka-
bly elastic: during the long decade from 1969 to 1983, for example, the average 
judge nearly doubled the supply of this service.56 
Doubling the supply of a service is an unusual achievement. Sometimes the 
supply of a particular service or good can be expanded at little or no marginal 
cost: when an airline has empty seats on a plane or a publisher can deliver a 
book electronically, the cost or effort of providing one more unit is nil. But or-
dinarily, an increase in the supply of a good or service requires significant addi-
tional cost: a restaurant can often serve more customers, for example, but there 
                
53 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-1 (1940–2013). For the denominators I 
used the number of “authorized federal district court judgeships” for each year. See supra 
note 27. 
54 See supra Figure 1. 
55 Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1877–80 (describing procedure’s instrumental purpose); 
Subrin & Main, supra note 19. 
56 In 1969, each federal judge terminated an average of 218 civil cases per year. In 1983 that 
number had increased to 422. See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-1 (1969–1983). 
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is a marginal cost associated with that increase in production.57 Typically the 
marginal cost would include additional staff, extra supplies, and more food. If 
there is no additional investment of this sort when the number of customers 
doubles, then the marginal cost may be a decline in the quality of the service 
and food. In that same vein, then, one might fairly wonder—and I later will re-
turn to this question—whether each of the average district judge’s thirty-five 
terminations per month in 1983 is a diluted and inferior version of the eighteen 
terminations per month that she produced in 1969. 
One possible explanation for the impressive increases in the number of 
terminations per judge is the increased efficiency of the judiciary. To be sure, 
efficiency and better case management were championed by Warren Burger, 
who became Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969.58 Judges may 
also have worked longer hours to increase their supply of terminations. Moreo-
ver, there was a dramatic expansion in the staff of the judiciary—namely, mag-
istrate judges, law clerks, and judges with senior status.59 
But if improved efficiency explains the increases, what explains the de-
creases—including, for example, the six years of steady decline from 1985 to 
1991 (as demonstrated in Figure 2 above)? If efficiency increased the average 
judge’s capacity to supply terminations at the rate of 473 cases per year in 
1985, why would she terminate only 328 cases (approximately two-thirds of the 
earlier number) in 1990?60 Importantly, for reasons that I address in the next 
subpart, there was no shortage of cases.61 Yet rather than tracking some number 
resembling maximum efficiency, the number of terminations each year instead 
closely tracked the number of newly-filed cases. 
                                                        
57  This logic assumes that there was no excess of waiters or food prior to the increase. Simi-
larly, there is certainly no indication that the courts had excess capacity in 1969. To the con-
trary, concerns about the lack of capacity precipitated the passage of the Federal Magistrates 
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107; see also REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 103 (1969) (referring to “an across-the-
board increase in judicial business in 1969” and to mounting “arrearages on the dockets of 
the district courts”). 
58  Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1862 n.116 (“I do not suggest that justice can ever be-
come automated . . . [,] yet [in] the medical profession . . . [it is] possible today for one phy-
sician or surgeon . . . to do three to ten or fifteen times what his counterpart could do.” (quot-
ing Warren E. Burger, Deferred Maintenance of Judicial Machinery, Speech at the National 
Conference on the Judiciary (Mar. 12, 1971), in WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 
56 (1990))). 
59  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 27–28 (1996); 
Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: The Choices Federal Judges 
Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 93 
(2012) (noting that, in 2009, senior district judges accounted for 21.2 percent of case termi-
nations and 26.8 percent of all trials); Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 
92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456 (1983); Moore, supra note 37, at 1189–90; Judith Resnik, The Fed-
eral Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 
86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2605 (1998); Resnik, supra note 22, at 949; Pro, supra note 27; see also 
infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
60  See supra note 53. 
61  See infra Part II. 
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The best explanation for the dynamic conformity between the number of 
cases terminated and the number of cases filed is simple: most civil cases in 
federal court are (and always have been) resolved relatively quickly. As I pre-
sent in part II below, the median time from filing to termination for a civil case 
in federal court is approximately eight months.62 Accordingly, the very close 
relationship between the number of cases terminated and the number of cases 
filed each year is no more mysterious than the close relationship each year be-
tween, say, the number of pregnancies within a population and the number of 
births: a predictably certain and short gestation period aligns those two num-
bers. Although the relationship between any particular case filing and its termi-
nation date is, naturally, somewhat less certain and more variable than a preg-
nancy, a strong analogy is appropriate since (i) the relationship between filings 
and terminations is remarkably close; (ii) that relationship has endured 
throughout the entire modern era of federal courts; and (iii) that relationship 
persists amid otherwise remarkably dynamic circumstances. 
Because correlation is insufficient proof of causation, I must acknowledge 
the possibility that causation runs in the opposite direction from what I have 
presumed above. Specifically, one might fairly wonder whether the number of 
terminations drives the number of filings (rather than vice versa): lawyers and 
litigants might view rises and falls in the number of terminations as an indicator 
of the court’s capacity and respond accordingly. This explanation would trigger 
a conversation along the lines of those who debate whether building wider 
roads relieves traffic congestion or instead, paradoxically, simply encourages 
more people to drive.63 But induced demand is not a plausible explanation here. 
To the extent that lawyers and litigants are sensitive to issues about the court’s 
capacity, presumably it would be court access (e.g., delays in processing), not 
the number of terminations, that would signal capacity.64 Also, if terminations 
drove the number of filings, we would expect some delay between the termina-
tion and filing numbers, since the number of cases terminated in a given year is 
not published until the following year. If there is any lag effect to be observed 
in this data, it appears to be an infrequent and modest amount of delay that runs 
in the direction of terminations trailing filings. This lag—to the extent that it 
exists at all—is consistent with the compelling if unremarkable explanation for 
the close relationship between filings and terminations, to-wit, most lawsuits 
terminate quickly (and always have done so).65 
                                                        
62  See also Moore, supra note 37. 
63  See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, STILL STUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING WITH PEAK-HOUR 
TRAFFIC CONGESTION (2004); M.J.H. MOGRIDGE, TRAVEL IN TOWNS: JAM YESTERDAY, JAM 
TODAY AND JAM TOMORROW? (1990); Gilles Duranton & Matthew A. Turner, The Funda-
mental Law of Road Congestion: Evidence from US Cities, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2616 
(2011). 
64  I will address court delays in Part II, infra. 
65  See infra Part II. 
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But even if this procedural constant is merely a product of the short shelf 
life of litigation, we have only re-framed the important questions. Still unan-
swered is the question how district judges could terminate enough cases (and 
terminate each one of them as fast as they ever did66) to keep pace with the 
dramatic increases in the number of filings? And to what extent are judges con-
sciously maintaining this constant? Especially in light of the fact that, statisti-
cally speaking, most cases are terminated by a voluntary settlement, one might 
wonder whether the short shelf life of litigation (and thus the dynamic conform-
ity between the numbers of terminations and filings) is the product of an invisi-
ble hand or a visible one? This query is examined in the discussion of pending 
cases in the next subpart. 
B. Pending Cases 
In this subpart, we have an opportunity to consider—even if indirectly—
the extent to which the short shelf life of litigation is judicially-directed or is 
instead simply the natural life cycle of litigation (unaffected by judicial behav-
ior). The extent to which judges control their caseloads is an important issue 
because much of this article imparts agency on the part of judges. Specifically, 
I speak of judges terminating cases, judges calibrating caseloads, and judges 
maintaining the constants. Judges have told me that cases on their dockets are 
not their cases, but rather are the parties’ cases; this suggests little or no agen-
cy. Yet, we also know that judges have an extraordinary amount of discretion 
that includes setting the pace of litigation, influencing how the law is applied, 
and occasionally even defining what the law requires.67 To address questions 
about the judges’ agency, I turn to data that captures the number of “pending 
cases” in the federal courts. Examination of this data also reveals another pro-
cedural constant. 
At any given time, the dockets of federal judges have a number of pending 
cases. Even in a regime where most cases are resolved relatively quickly, some 
cases—especially those filed near the end of the fiscal year—will be pending at 
the start of the following fiscal year. (Consider, again, the analogy of the con-
nection between the number of pregnancies and the number of births.) The ini-
tial point here is simply that the number of cases (or pregnancies) pending at 
the end of each year is never zero; there is a statistically-predictable carry-over 
from year to year. 
Yet the number of civil cases pending in the federal system at each year’s 
end appears greater than just that set of cases that would be the product of a sta-
tistical carry-over. Indeed, notwithstanding everything set forth in the previous 
subpart, as a matter of fact, there are hundreds of thousands of cases that are 
carried from one year to the next. For example, on June 30, 2013, there were 
                                                        
66  See infra Part II. 
67  See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal 
Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693 (1988). 
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295,701 pending civil cases.68 This rather substantial inventory of pending cas-
es demonstrates that the number of terminations in a given year is an adjusted 
function of the number of cases filed that year. In other words, the filing and 
termination numbers each year are not exactly the same, even though, as Fig-
ures 1 and 2 above demonstrated, they are almost the same. 
So, let us focus on this adjustment. As a mathematical matter, in any given 
year, this adjustment is simply the difference between the number of cases ter-
minated and the number of cases filed. From 1940 to 2013, the average differ-
ence (adjustment) each year was ± 7,423 cases—sometimes the number of ter-
minations was higher than the number of filed cases, and sometimes it was 
lower.69 As a percentage of the total number of filed cases, the average annual 
adjustment is ± 5.1 percent.70 Thus, in any given year, the magnitude of this ad-
justment is very small; indeed, it has to be small or we would not have ob-
served the sort of identity in the lines exhibited in Figures 1 and 2 above. 
The amount of the adjustment each year is so small that it could be mistak-
en as but a very modest error rate for the phenomenon that we observed in the 
previous subpart. Yet, because the adjustments were positive in 75 percent of 
the years from 1940–2013, and negative only 25 percent of the time,71 this does 
not appear to be a randomly distributed error; hence the significant size of the 
inventory. Moreover, as Figure 3, below, demonstrates, there is a distinct pat-
tern to the accumulation and shedding of the number of pending cases. Specifi-
cally, the total number of pending cases at the end of each year closely tracks 
the number of cases that were filed that year. 
FIGURE 3: CASES FILED AND CASES PENDING72 
Through increases and decreases in the number of cases filed, from the 
start of the third era, through the transition to the fourth, and to the present day, 
the judiciary has carried about one year’s worth of cases as inventory.73 The 
                
68 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-1 (2013). 
69 Id. at tbl.C-1 (1940–2013). 
70 Id. 
71 Id.
72 Id. 
73 The average number of pending cases is about 103 percent of the number of filed cases. 
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coefficient of determination (r2 value) between the number of cases filed in a 
given year and the number of cases pending at that year’s end is 98.2. It is pe-
culiar that there is any significant inventory of pending cases since the elasticity 
in the supply of terminations could surely minimize the number of pending cas-
es.74 But it is especially remarkable that the inventory of pending cases is con-
sistently equivalent to one year’s worth of cases. 
Although it is conceivable that the natural life cycle of litigation, apart 
from the influence of judges and the judicial process, could consistently for 
seventy years produce one year’s inventory of pending cases, there is another, 
more likely explanation. Maintaining approximately one year’s inventory of 
pending cases may be a judicial preference—the sweet spot between, on one 
hand, terminating so many cases that judges may be perceived as idle, and on 
the other hand, carrying such high inventories that the legislature creates more 
judgeships.75 
This is not a novel suggestion. A formal model and empirical research 
from Professors Michael Beenstock and Yoel Haitovsky demonstrated that 
“judges, for reputational reasons, will avoid a large case backlog and hence will 
dispose of more cases when the caseload increases.”76 Similarly, Professors Er-
ic Helland and Jonathan Klick have observed that judges in class action cases 
have an incentive to easily grant the attorney’s fee request in order to terminate 
cases rapidly, thus avoiding court congestion.77 Simply put, empirical studies 
confirm the intuitive notion that judges are sensitive to the magnitude of their 
caseloads.78 
                                                        
74  See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
75  For sources discussing the judiciary’s opposition to the appointment of more judges, see 
Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges—The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 
JUDICATURE 187, 194 (1993); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Trans-
forming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 984 (2000) (recognizing that 
many judges argued against expansion of the federal judiciary to preserve selectivity and 
minimize inconsistencies); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 1101, 1143 n.139 (2006) (“[A] federal judiciary rising above 1,000 members will be of 
lesser quality and could be dominated by a bureaucracy of ancillary personnel.” (citing 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE’S 1991 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY, reprinted in THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 2)); Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More 
Judges, Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 79 A.B.A. J. 70 
(1993). See generally William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, 
and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 
(1996). 
76  Jef De Mot et al., Appellate Caseload and the Switch to Comparative Negligence, 42 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 147, 148 (2015); see also Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Effect 
of Judicial Expedience on Attorney Fees in Class Actions, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 171, 187 
(2007) (citing Michael Beenstock & Yoel Haitovsky, Does the Appointment of Judges In-
crease the Output of the Judiciary?, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 351 (2004)). See generally 
LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 9, 12, 31, 38–41, 210, 214, 229 (2013). 
77  Helland & Klick, supra note 76. 
78  See infra notes 81–82, 99–102 and accompanying text. 
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If maintaining one year’s inventory were not a preference of the court, we 
would expect the number of pending cases to decline dramatically in years 
when the number of newly-filed cases declines. After all, if the number of 
pending cases were simply a function of the natural life cycle of litigation, the 
system should “catch up” during the lean years (when the number of new fil-
ings dips). If in the lean years of 1986, 1987, and 1988, for example, every 
judge terminated the same number of cases that she terminated in 1985, the to-
tal number of pending cases at the end of 1988 would have been 168,142 cases 
instead of the actual number, 244,242 cases.79 The judiciary would have expe-
rienced a decrease of more than 30 percent in the inventory of pending cases. 
Yet, the actual number of pending cases in 1988 instead closely tracked the 
number of new filings (239,634 and 244,242, respectively).80 
The suggestion here is only that judges, sensitive to the magnitude of their 
caseload, influence the pace of terminations in order to calibrate the desired 
number of pending cases. Naturally, judges can determine the pace of many 
cases—and thus can hasten or delay the filing and consideration of dispositive 
motions and other key events. Even though most cases settle (and are therefore 
somewhat beyond the immediate control of judges), the ability of a judge to in-
duce settlements is a well-established phenomenon.81 Thus, there appears to be 
a visible hand on enough cases that judges influence the total number of pend-
ing cases. Importantly, by implication then, judges have some control over the 
total number of terminations in a given year, including, presumably, some of 
the voluntary settlements. This calibration is the procedural constant in action. 
Of course, this data doesn’t address whether this Goldilocks-constant inventory 
of pending cases is attributable to an organized, collective action or to some 
universally shared innate sense of the judicial task. The unlikely prospect of 
collective action on the part of the judiciary would support the latter explana-
tion.82 
So, in this part I, we observed two procedural constants. First, we saw that 
the number of terminations in a given year is very closely aligned with the 
number of newly-filed cases. And second, we observed that, to the extent those 
two numbers are not exactly the same, the difference—the adjustment—is put 
to the task of adjusting an inventory of total pending cases that itself tracks the 
number of newly-filed cases (i.e., one year’s inventory). Thus, but for the slight 
adjustment necessary to calibrate the overall number of pending cases, the rela-
tionship among these three numbers has remained constant throughout the 
modern history of federal courts: Cases Filed = Cases Terminated (± Adjust-
                                                        
79  See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-1 (1986–1988). 
80  Id. at tbl.C-1 (1988). 
81  See, e.g., Galanter & Cahill, supra note 10; Kritzer, supra note 10; Todd D. Peterson, Re-
storing Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 41, 44 (1995). 
82  Judicial education efforts may help explain this. I am presently researching that hypothe-
sis. 
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ment) = Total Cases Pending. Importantly, in order to maintain these constants, 
judges must terminate cases at a rate that keeps pace with the number of new 
case filings. 
II. THE TIME FROM FILING TO TERMINATION 
The next procedural constant is the shelf life of a civil case. This inquiry 
differs from Part I because it examines the data regarding individual cases, as 
opposed to aggregate dockets. For at least the past fifty years, the average civil 
action in federal court has terminated approximately eight months after it was 
filed.83 Data from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts also enables a more 
nuanced look at this procedural constant. 
A. Median Cases, Big Cases, and Small Cases 
Figure 4, below, demonstrates that the median time from filing to disposi-
tion for a civil action in federal court was eight months in 1963 and nine 
months in 2013. The time to disposition for the median civil case throughout 
these five decades has never strayed outside the range of seven to ten months; 
the standard deviation from the mean of eight is less than one. 
FIGURE 4: TIME TO TERMINATION: THE MEDIAN CASE84 
The average life span of a typical civil case was constant—or, technically, 
declined85—even during the long decade from 1969 to 1983 when the average 
judge’s civil caseload doubled.86 Echoing the observations made in part I, 
above, this constant is neither necessary nor inevitable. Indeed, if one views a 
procedural system as integrating law and fact to produce a termination in each 
                
83 In this Part II, the relevant data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts is un-
fortunately limited to the period from 1963 forward. 
84 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1963–2013). Unfortunately the AO data 
starts in 1963. 
85 In 1969, the median case was terminated ten months after it was filed. In 1983, the medi-
an case was terminated seven months after it was filed. These match the absolute highs and 
absolute lows, respectively, for the fifty years of data represented in Figure 4. 
86 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
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case,87 one would expect an increase in the number of cases on a per-judge ba-
sis to introduce a corresponding increase in the amount of time necessary to re-
solve each case. Yet no such effect is observed; quite the contrary. This obser-
vation is simply another look at the remarkable (or curious, as the case may be) 
elasticity of the judiciary’s supply of the service of terminating cases.88 
The data presented in Figure 4, above, also refutes the all-too-familiar nar-
rative of the litigation crisis, to-wit: that the courts are plagued with inordinate 
delays.89 As a matter of fact, civil cases in federal court are—and long have 
been—resolved promptly.90 Decades of empirical data and reams of careful le-
gal scholarship have done tragically little to dislodge a narrative about chronic 
and worsening delays in federal court that has traction for reasons other than its 
truth.91 
Although the average (median) case has not experienced delay as a result 
of the dramatic increase in the number of cases, some commentators decry the 
long and lengthening delay in the so-called “big cases.”92 The big cases are 
those cases that make up between 5 and 15 percent of the caseload, but involve 
the highest stakes, the largest law firms, and/or the most complex matters.93 
Although big cases constitute a small percentage of federal court litigation, the 
problems with big cases tend to dominate popular narratives about civil litiga-
tion and tend to fuel reforms that affect all cases, rather than only the big cas-
es.94 Of course, there could be a large and worsening problem with delays in 
the big cases that a focus exclusively on the median case would simply over-
look. Yet, Figure 5, below, which presents the Administrative Office’s data re-
garding the civil case at the ninetieth percentile for case length, suggests that 
the amount of time from filing to termination in the big cases did not increase 
substantially as a result of the large expansion in the number of cases (nor as a 
result of any other dynamism in the federal courts over this period). 
                                                        
87  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
88  See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. 
89  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
90  See infra Part III. 
91  See supra note 52; see also Moore, supra note 37, at 1183; Subrin & Main, supra note 1, 
at 1875–78. 
92  See, e.g., Leonard S. Janofsky, The “Big Case”: A “Big Burden” on Our Courts, 66 
A.B.A. J. 848 (1980); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984). 
93  Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1875–78. 
94  Id. 
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FIGURE 5: TIME TO TERMINATION: THE BIG CASE95 
Even if there is too much volatility in this graph to label its subject a pro-
cedural constant, Figure 5, above, demonstrates that, for several decades, the 
average time from filing to termination for the big cases was 30.5 months, with 
the range spreading no more than 20 percent in each direction, and a standard 
deviation of 4.2. 
For the sake of completeness, I include another graph produced from this 
data set. Figure 6, below, combines the data from Figures 4 (the median case) 
and 5 (the big case), and also adds the time from filing to termination for the 
cases at the tenth percentile of case length—that is, the small case.96 
FIGURE 6: TIME FROM FILING TO TERMINATION97 
The portrait in Figure 6, above, conveys relative stability. Only the data for 
the big case shows any volatility or slope, as already discussed.98 The data for 
the big cases also has a curious property: the time-to-termination has a fairly 
                
95 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1963–1999). Unfortunately, this data is 
available only for the period 1963 through 1999. 
96 Because this data is not representing anything about the size of the case itself, the labels 
“small,” “median,” and “big,” could be perceived as misleading. To be clear, the data is 
merely reporting the time from filing to termination for the cases that fall at the 10th, 50th, 
and 90th percentiles. 
97 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1963–1999). Unfortunately, some of this 
data is available only for the period 1963 through 1999. 
98 See supra note 95. 
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strong inverse correlation (a correlation coefficient of -0.71 from a possible 
range of -1.00 to +1.0099) with the size of the overall civil caseload. In other 
words, the greater the number of civil cases that are filed in a given year, the 
more quickly the big cases tend to be resolved. To illustrate this relationship, 
Figure 7, below, graphs the data from Figures 1 and 5 on the same graph. 
FIGURE 7: LENGTH OF THE BIG CASE VERSUS OVERALL CASELOADS100 
This inverse relationship may be further evidence of the proposition, dis-
cussed in Part I.B, above,101 that the magnitude of judicial caseloads affects 
how judges manage cases toward termination.102
B. Stages of Termination 
The consistency of the shelf life of litigation is a curious finding in light of 
the dramatic expansion in the judicial caseload. The data captured by the Ad-
ministrative Office allows for an even more nuanced account of this constant. 
In addition to examining the length of the small, the median, and the big case, 
as discussed above, we can review the average amounts of time to each of sev-
eral key stages of litigation. This inquiry allows us to investigate whether the 
consistency of the eight-months figure is masking other fundamental changes in 
the timing of the life cycle of litigation. 
The data presented in this subpart assign the termination of every case to 
one of four categories. The four categories are represented with arrows in the 
graphic below. Importantly, these data capture the stage of the termination of 
each case, and not the reason for the termination. The first category/arrow in-
cludes cases that were terminated after the filing of a complaint, but before 
there was any court action. Presumably, nearly all of the terminated cases as-
signed to the first category were settled by agreement of the parties or after a 
voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff. Once there is any “court action”—a ruling 
                
99 The correlation coefficient is -0.75 when the length of the big case is correlated against 
the number of cases on a per-judge basis. 
100 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbls.C-1 & C-5 (1963–2013).
101 See infra Part I. 
102 See supra notes 75–82 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III. 
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on a motion, for example103—the termination will necessarily be assigned to 
one of the remaining three categorical stages. The latter three categories use 
two benchmark events in litigation—the pretrial conference and trial—to iden-
tify the stage of the termination. 
One might imagine that the tip of each of these arrows is a successive de-
parture point on a single highway; all travelers depart the highway at one of 
these four exits. The highway is a useful analogy because we have the average 
“travel time” to each of the four departure points on the litigation highway. 
Figure 8, below, presents nearly fifty years of data for the average time from 
filing to termination for each of the four possible termination points. 
FIGURE 8: TIME FROM FILING TO TERMINATION104 
Figure 8 reveals two more procedural constants—one from each of the first 
two categories. First, for cases that were terminated without and before any 
court action, the average time from filing to termination is six months. In the 
past fifty years, that number has never fallen below four nor exceeded eight 
months. With a standard deviation of just 1.1 from the mean, the graphical rep-
resentation of this data is essentially a flat line. 
                
103 For a description of the Administrative Office’s system of coding, see CIVIL STATISTICAL 
REPORTING GUIDE, TECH. TRAINING & SUPPORT DIV. & STATISTICS DIV. OF THE  
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (July 1999), available  
at http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Documents/Publications/Using 
_Court_Records_Appendix/Civil_Statistical_Reporting_Guide.pdf. For the varieties of this 
coding system, see Moore, supra note 37. 
104 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1963–2013). Unfortunately, some of 
this data is only available from the period 1963 forward. 
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Second, for cases that are terminated after some court action but before a 
pretrial conference, the time from filing to termination is a fairly consistent 
seven months. Although the cases assigned to this category experienced some 
“court action,” it is important to appreciate that the termination was not neces-
sarily a product of that court action. For example, cases that settled by volun-
tary agreement of the parties—but after a motion to dismiss was denied, or after 
a motion to amend was granted—would be assigned to this category, provided 
the case never reached a pretrial conference.105 The time-to-termination for 
cases at this stage consistently falls within the range of five to nine months, and 
both the mean and median are seven months.106 With a standard deviation of 
1.1, again, the graphical representation of this data is essentially a flat line. 
The other two categories are represented graphically with lines that are rel-
atively steady, although not constant. Both of these lines exhibit an observable 
slope—one drifting slowly downward, and the other trending upward. For cases 
that are terminated at or after the pretrial conference (but before a trial), the av-
erage amount of time from filing to termination has slowly declined a total of 
about 22 percent over the last five decades—from approximately eighteen 
months to fourteen months.107 For cases that are resolved at trial, the average 
amount of time from filing to termination has steadily increased to an aggregate 
50 percent gain—from about sixteen months fifty years ago to twenty-four 
months today.108 The graphical lines that chart these latter two categories also 
reflect some dramatic spikes for outlier events in 2006, 2007, and 2009.109 
But for the relatively modest changes detailed in the preceding paragraph, 
Figure 8, above, conveys a picture of relative stability. Even as judicial case-
                                                        
105  See supra note 103. 
106  See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1963–2013). 
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
109  Every year there are a number of consolidated cases that are terminated, and occasionally 
the size (and the unique circumstances) of one set of consolidated cases can overwhelm the 
statistical portrait of federal civil litigation in a given year. In 2006, the Eastern District of 
Michigan terminated more than 15,000 breast implant cases at or after pretrial (but before 
trial); most of these cases had been pending for at least eight years. The Eastern District of 
Michigan accounted for more than 55 percent of all of the terminations at or after pretrial in 
the entire federal court system in 2006. If the data from this district is removed from the 
overall counts, the median time interval for 2006 cases that terminated at or after pretrial was 
17.3 months. In 2007, the Middle District of Louisiana terminated more than 6,300 consoli-
dated cases associated with an oil refinery explosion; these cases had been pending for more 
than ten years. The Middle District of Louisiana accounted for more than 66 percent of all of 
the terminations at trial in the entire federal court system in 2007. If the data from this dis-
trict is removed from the overall counts, the median time interval for 2007 cases that termi-
nated at trial was 24.3 months. In 2009, the Middle District of Louisiana terminated still 
more of the cases associated with the aforementioned oil refinery explosion; many of these 
cases had then been pending for more than twelve years. The Middle District of Louisiana 
accounted for 33 percent of all of the terminations at trial in the entire federal court system in 
2009. If the data from this district is removed from the overall counts, the median time inter-
val for 2009 cases that terminated at trial was 23.5 months. 
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loads changed more or less dramatically, the pace of litigation—as metered by 
the benchmark events of pretrial conferences and trials—remained relatively 
constant. Returning to the analogy of the highway, even as the overall amount 
of traffic varied dramatically over the past fifty years—including more than 
doubling on a per-lane basis (and increasing more than five-fold on an absolute 
basis)—the average travel time for drivers who departed at the first and second 
exits remained constant; travelers to the third and fourth exits experienced a 
modest decline and a modest increase, respectively, in their travel times. Traffic 
engineers would surely be impressed, if not jealous. 
For our purposes, this stability confirms that the basic structure of the tim-
ing of litigation has remained constant for the past fifty years. More specifical-
ly, the average case takes eight months from start to finish; cases that are ter-
minated at or before a pretrial conference take six to eight months; cases 
resolved after pretrial conference but before a trial have taken fourteen to eight-
een (with current trends pushing the lower end of that bound); and cases re-
solved at trial have taken sixteen to twenty-four months (with current trends 
pushing the higher end of that bound). 
III. HOW THE CONSTANTS SHAPED REFORM 
Although the changes wrought by the transition from the third to the fourth 
era of procedure were “revolutionary,”110 some things remained constant. In 
fact, it was the commitment to maintain the procedural constants that essential-
ly caused the revolutionary change. 
In the long decade from 1969 to 1983, judges faced the relentless pressures 
of constant year-over-year increases in the number of newly-filed cases.111 
Judges had essentially three options when they felt this pressure: (1) ignore the 
mounting pressure and continue processing cases as before; (2) continue pro-
cessing cases as before, but work harder; or (3) do something different; change 
the mode of processing cases. 
One can fairly assume that option (2) was fully pursued. As their caseloads 
increased, judges undoubtedly worked more intently and labored for longer 
hours. But this option had inherent limitations; even in 1969, judges were not 
idle.112 Any excess capacity was ultimately consumed, of course, and at that 
                                                        
110  See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010) (referring to the “revolution[]” in the law on pleading); D. Mi-
chael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Su-
preme Court’s New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 38 (1988) (dis-
cussing the “new” use of summary judgment); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape 
of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 527 (2010) (referring to the “revolution in 
pleading”). 
111  See supra notes 29, 56 and accompanying text. 
112  See supra note 57. 
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point in time the available options for dealing with the unremitting increases in 
the caseload were reduced to options (1) and (3). 
Option (1) would have likely delayed the processing of cases and created 
inventory backlogs. Maintaining the procedural constants foreclosed this op-
tion. This was unfortunate. Delays and backlogs, although hardly virtuous,113 
must be evaluated in light of the baseline alternative: delays may be cruel, but 
cruel compared to what? Like economists who advocate deficit spending during 
recessions, judges could have tolerated delays and backlogs with an eye toward 
catching up in future years. Or, to the extent that delays and backlogs proved 
intolerable, those circumstances might have triggered legitimate reforms—for 
instance, additional judgeships, rule amendments, and Congressional reforms. 
But with the procedural constants entrenched, the judges instead engaged 
in option (3). Specifically, they changed their mode of processing cases in order 
to double their supply of terminations—keeping pace with the number of new-
ly-filed cases and deciding individual cases as promptly as ever.114 This change 
in the mode of processing cases returns us to the question posed in part I, to-
wit: was the average district judge’s thirty-five terminations per month in 1983 
a diluted and inferior version of the eighteen terminations per month that she 
produced in 1969? The answer to that question depends, of course, on the 
changes that the judges fashioned in implementing option (3). 
To better understand how the judiciary responded, let us begin with a snap-
shot of the average federal judge’s civil caseload for a month in the heart of the 
third era of American civil procedure—several years before the long decade 
commenced. In 1965, for example, an average of nineteen cases entered and 
eighteen cases exited a judge’s civil docket each month.115 On average, two of 
these terminated cases were “land condemnation cases, habeas corpus cases, 
deportation reviews and motions to vacate sentence”—easy cases that the Ad-
ministrative Office excepts from its data set.116 Setting these two easy cases 
aside, Figure 9, below, depicts the stage of termination for the remaining six-
teen ordinary civil matters—that is, where each case exited the aforementioned 
litigation highway. 
                                                        
113  See supra note 51. 
114  See infra Part III. 
115  See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-1 (1965). 
116  Id. For a discussion about the exclusion of these “easy” cases, see Moore, supra note 37. 
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FIGURE 9: TERMINATIONS BY STAGE (AVERAGE MONTH, 1965)117 
Figure 9, above, demonstrates that half of the sixteen cases were terminat-
ed without—and before—any court action. Thus the other eight cases were 
terminated after some court action. Of these eight, three were terminated before 
the pretrial conference; these may have received modest or significant court at-
tention prior to their termination, but given the impotence of motions to dismiss 
and motions for summary judgment in the third era,118 these terminations were 
most likely the product of voluntary settlements by the parties. The remaining 
five cases were managed for trial.119 On average, three of those cases settled on 
the eve of trial, and two were tried. 
Now, with the benefit of Table A, below, let us compare the average feder-
al judge’s civil caseload for an average month at the start and end of the long 
decade from 1969 to 1983. During this long decade, we know that the number 
of new filings each year more than tripled on an absolute basis, and doubled on 
a per-judge basis.120 
TABLE A: TERMINATIONS BY STAGE (AVG. MONTH)121
 1969 1983 
Terminated Without any Court Action 7122 (47%) 15 (51%) 
Terminated Before a Pretrial Conference 3 (23%) 9 (29%) 
Terminated at or After the Pretrial 3 (18%) 4 (14%) 
Terminated at Trial 2 (12%) 2 (6%) 
Total 15123 30124 
                
117 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1965). 
118 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
119 Judge William Young has eloquently described the difference between managing for trial 
and managing for settlement. See Young, supra note 13; William G. Young, Keynote: Mus-
tering Holmes’ “Regiments”, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 451 (2014). 
120 See supra notes 28–29, 47–56 and accompanying text. 
121 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1969, 1983). 
122 For purposes of illustrating the caseload for an average month, these figures are rounded 
to the nearest whole number. The percentage amounts are the more precise of the two figures 
in each cell. 
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This table reveals at least three important data points: 
First, the bottom row of the table reflects a doubling in the number of ter-
minations (from fifteen per month to thirty). This doubling reflects the court’s 
success in keeping pace with the doubling of the number of newly-filed cas-
es.125 This aversion to delay and backlogs is the procedural constant in action. 
Second, as the number of terminations doubled over the course of the long 
decade, the number of cases that experienced any court action was only half of 
the total number of terminations. Thus, in an average month in 1969, there was 
some court action in only eight of the fifteen cases terminated;126 the other sev-
en terminated without any court action. Still, because of the doubling over the 
course of the long decade, in 1983, the number of cases receiving court action 
jumped from eight in 1969 to fifteen in 1983.127 And of course we know not 
only that the number of terminated cases doubled to match the increase in case 
filing, but also that the overall time-to-termination statistics remained con-
stant.128 
Third, Table A, above, reveals what the courts did differently: more cases 
were terminated at earlier stages of litigation. When the number of cases requir-
ing court attention increased by seven additional cases per month, 86 percent 
(six of seven cases) of that increase was absorbed into the category of cases that 
were resolved before a pretrial conference.129 Naturally, this reallocation of 
                                                                                                                                
123  In addition to these fifteen cases, the court terminated three “land condemnation, habeas 
corpus cases, deportation reviews and motions to vacate sentence.” Data for these cases are 
omitted from Table C-5 of the data from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. 
124  In addition to these fifteen cases, the court terminated five “land condemnation, habeas 
corpus cases, deportation reviews and motions to vacate sentence.” Data for these cases are 
omitted from Table C-5 of the data from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. 
125  See supra Part I.A. 
126  The eight cases include the three cases terminated before a pretrial conference, plus the 
three terminated at or after the pretrial, and the two terminated at trial. 
127  The fifteen cases include the nine cases terminated before a pretrial conference, plus the 
four terminated at or after the pretrial, and the two terminated at trial. 
128  See supra Part II.A. 
129  If the number of new cases were instead terminated across the various stages in propor-
tions that matched the 1969 allocations, the number terminated before a pretrial conference 
would have been six (instead of nine), the number terminated at or after pretrial conference 
would have been five (instead of three), and the number terminated at trial would have been 
four (instead of two). It is important to point out that while the shift toward earlier termina-
tion of cases was underway, the benchmark of a “pretrial conference” was also shifting. In 
the third era, a typical “pretrial conference” occurred approximately ten days before the 
scheduled trial date. See Warren K. Urbom, Calendar Control—Organizing the Flow of 
Cases, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 7, 9 (1973); 
Peter T. Fay, Settlement Approaches, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGES, supra, at 67, 71–72. The conference then contemplated by FED. R. CIV. P. 
16—and the pretrial conference serving as the benchmark for these time-to-termination sta-
tistics—thus was a pretrial conference about an imminent trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; Res-
nik, supra note 22, at 935–36. In other words, a case that reached the “pretrial conference” 
benchmark in the third era had made its way through the motion stage, through discovery, 
and was close to trial. But Federal Rule 16 was significantly overhauled in 1983 (and has 
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case terminations avoided delay, because all of the new cases (or a mix of old 
and new cases that approximated the number of new cases) were resolved at the 
earliest stages of litigation, delays were avoided and the overall time-to-
termination statistic remained constant. Returning to the highway analogy, it is 
as if the traffic engineers, faced with a doubling of the number of travelers, di-
rected all of the new travelers on the highway to depart at the first or second 
exits, no matter their preferred destination. Such a (re)direction keeps constant 
the overall average commute time. 
The reallocation of cases to earlier stages of termination was achieved 
through new interpretations of extant rules. Two motions, in particular, that had 
been left for dead were given a new zombie-like life.130 Heightened pleading 
standards were introduced by the lower courts in the 1970s, and persisted in 
various iterations for decades before the Supreme Court ultimately endorsed the 
aggressive use of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.131 Meanwhile, 
summary judgment emerged as the focal point of litigation as much as a decade 
before the Supreme Court ratified that practice with its 1986 trilogy of cases.132 
The result of these and complementary reforms was the termination of cases at 
earlier stages of litigation. 
The termination of cases at earlier stages of litigation was an austerity 
measure that valued expediency over accuracy. Yet it was pursued because this 
approach kept the number of terminations in line with the number of filings, 
and it held constant the time-to-termination metric. Such an approach is, of 
course, of great consequence. Unfortunately, cases that are redirected to depart 
                                                                                                                                
been amended again many times since). Since 1983, the Federal Rule requires scheduling 
and planning conferences at much earlier stages in the litigation process. Specifically, a 
scheduling order must issue within 120 days of service of the complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 
16(b)(2). That scheduling order, in turn, must “set dates for pretrial conferences and for tri-
al.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(v). Note the plural use of the term pretrial conferences. These 
pretrial conferences now regard subjects much more preliminary than the trial, including 
“eliminating frivolous claims,” “amending the pleadings,” and “scheduling discovery.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(A)–(B), (F). Accordingly, in the fourth era, a case that reaches the “pre-
trial conference” benchmark may only be reaching a Rule 16(b) scheduling conference. This 
shift in the timing and the meaning of a pretrial conference means that my discussion of the 
shift toward earlier termination of cases is even worse than it appears: fewer cases are reach-
ing the pretrial conference benchmark even as that benchmark moves ever closer to the start-
ing line. 
130  Both the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment were thought to be 
dead. See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1844–45; see also supra note 8. For a list of other 
Fourth Era reforms, see supra note 30. 
131  See generally Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of 
Rules, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311 (2001) (recounting the introduction of heightened pleading in all 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals). The Supreme Court embraced a liberal notice pleading 
standard as late as 2002 with its Leatherman and Swierkiewicz decisions, before abruptly 
changing course with its embrace of plausibility pleading in Twombly and Iqbal. 
132  Burbank, supra note 32 (noting that summary judgment “started to assume a greater role 
in the 1970s”). 
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the litigation highway at the first or second exits may not belong there.133 Fur-
ther, even litigants with nonmeritorious positions can be denied a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.134 
In summary, then, by the end of the long decade, the courts had committed 
to a strategy that rejected option (1), exhausted option (2), and embraced option 
(3). Option (3) was to terminate more cases at earlier stages of litigation. 
IV. LAWMAKERS ADD CASE MANAGEMENT 
A. A Formal Reform to Complement the Judge-Initiated Reforms 
Throughout most of the long decade from 1969 to 1983, there were only 
relatively modest formal reforms by procedural rulemakers or Congress to ad-
dress the fundamental challenges that district judges faced with their burgeon-
ing caseloads. It was only after the caseload crisis was almost behind them that 
lawmakers responded boldly and formally—prescribing case management for 
all cases.135 Echoing the mandate of the procedural constants, “avoiding delay” 
was a major refrain of these case management reforms.136 Never mind that, by 
any measure, cases were no more delayed in the 1980s than they were in the 
1960s.137 
In 1983, waves of reforms required judges to get involved earlier and more 
aggressively in each case.138 Specifically, Rule 16 was amended to make 
“scheduling and case management an express goal of pretrial procedure.”139 
Similarly, Rule 26 was amended to require judges to use active case manage-
ment to curtail discovery abuse.140 
                                                        
133  For citations to authorities discussing the fateful consequences of early termination of 
cases, see Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1849. 
134  See generally Subrin & Main, supra note 1. 
135  Case management had been the norm for big cases since the 1970s. And the Federal Ju-
dicial Center was promoting it for all cases in the 1970s. But the formal reforms came much 
later. See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 669 (2010); Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1862–63. 
136  See, e.g., Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Costs of Litigation: Case Man-
agement, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 253, 253–54 n.3 (1985) (describing case management as an effort to “structure and 
shepherd[] [a case to] its expeditious completion”); see also Hubert L. Will et al., The Role 
of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 89, 203 (1976). 
137  See supra Part II.A. 
138  Gensler, supra note 135, at 677; Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1588 (2003); Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2199 (1989). 
139  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1983); see also id. (“Given the signifi-
cant changes in federal civil litigation since 1938 that are not reflected in Rule 16, it has been 
extensively rewritten and expanded to meet the challenges of modern litigation.”). See gen-
erally Gensler, supra note 135, at 677; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes 
to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261, 1268 (2010). 
140  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note (1983). See generally ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
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The timing of the case management reforms was unfortunate because, after 
1985, civil caseloads quit growing. That year marked the end of decades of 
constant growth in the number of newly-filed civil cases.141 In five of the six 
years from 1986 through 1991, there was a year-over-year decline in the num-
ber of newly-filed civil cases.142 In fact, in the twenty-three years since 1985, 
there has been virtually no growth: in 1985 there were 273,670 new civil fil-
ings, and in 2013, there were 283,087.143 This represents an annual growth rate 
of approximately 0.3 percent since 1985.144 Of course, one might fairly specu-
late that the termination of cases at earlier stages of litigation chilled putative 
plaintiffs from filing cases, thereby stemming this tide. But whatever the rea-
sons, the pressure of an ever-increasing flow of cases relented, beginning in 
1985. 
However, the worst thing about case management is not that it came too 
late, but rather that it came at all. Because, unfortunately, the year 1985 also 
marked the end of decades of stability in the percentage of cases terminated 
“without court action.” These are cases that depart the litigation highway at the 
first exit—settled by the parties without and before the court is involved in the 
case. Since this metric was first captured in 1963, the percentage of cases that 
terminated without court action hovered consistently around 50 percent—even 
throughout the long decade of caseload increases.145 In 1985, that number was 
52 percent—its highest level since 1967.146 These data confirm not only that 
“most cases settle[d],” but also that most cases settled without any judicial in-
terference.147 This data point changed dramatically in the five years between 
1985 and 1990, when the percentage of cases terminated without court action 
was cut nearly in half.148 The number has fallen further since. 
Figure 10, below, is an area chart that vividly demonstrates the shift away 
from terminations without court action and the shift toward terminations before 
a pretrial conference. This graph is essentially the pie chart from Figure 9 
charted over time. 
                                                                                                                                
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 30–36 (1984); 
Gensler, supra note 135, at 677. 
141  From 1962 to 1985, there was only one year when there was not year-over-year growth 
in the number of newly-filed civil cases. 
142  Since 1985, there have been fourteen years when there was a year-over-year decline, and 
fourteen years when there was a year-over-year increase. 
143  See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-1 (1986–2013). See generally Moore, su-
pra note 37. 
144  For a much more sophisticated account of different ways that one might measure the 
growth in the civil caseload, see Moore, supra note 37. 
145  See supra Figure 9 and Table A. 
146  For reference, the low water mark from the years 1963 through 1985 was 44 percent in 
1978. The high water mark was 54 percent in 1964. 
147  See supra note 10 and Part I.B. 
148  See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1986–2013). 
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FIGURE 10: AREA CHART: TERMINATIONS BY STAGE149 
Naturally, the requirement that judges involve themselves earlier in each 
case decreased the number of cases terminated before there was any court ac-
tion. Thus, in the substantial number of cases that would have faded from the 
dockets without any court action, there was—and is now—court action. 
Although the proliferation of case management is the likely culprit for the 
substantial diminution in the number of cases decided without court action, the 
timing is curious since the number of cases terminated without court action 
didn’t decline for several years after its grand introduction. Early case man-
agement was underway when Professor Judith Resnik warned of its conse-
quences in her 1982 seminal article.150 The aforementioned 1983 amendments 
purported to institutionalize the practice.151 Yet, even in 1985, the percentage of 
cases terminated without court action was 52 percent.152 In the years that fol-
lowed, that percentage dropped to 49 percent (1986), 43 percent (1987), 36 
percent (1988), 30 percent (1989), and 27 percent (1990).153 Presumably, the 
delayed onset was but a lag between the adoption of the case management 
mandates and their full implementation by judges.154 
                
149 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23. 
150 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
151 See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
152 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-1 (1985). 
153 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tb.C-1 (1986–1990). 
154 One might fairly wonder whether the decrease in the number of cases decided without 
court action was a product not of the 1983 reforms, but one of the later waves of case man-
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B. The Vanishing Trial 
Many commentators have documented and eulogized the vanishing trial.155 
Naturally, trials are another casualty of the procedural constants: trials take 
longer and therefore cause delays to which the judiciary is pathologically 
averse.156 Interestingly, though, my study of procedural constants views 1985 
as the year when trials became endangered. This may surprise readers who 
have absorbed the conventional wisdom that the trial has been in decline since 
long before 1985.157 The timing issue is important if we are to understand why 
trials disappeared and how they might be restored. 
To be sure, the percentage of cases terminated by trial has been in steady 
decline for at least half a century. See Figure 10, above. But until 1985, the ab-
solute number of cases terminated by trial each year had consistently grown. 
Indeed, the total number of civil trials in 1985 was nearly twice the number of 
trials in 1963. But 1985 is the pivotal year when even the absolute number of 
trials began steadily to decline. By 1997 the absolute number of trials across the 
                                                                                                                                
agement reform. But the second and third waves—in 1990 and 1993, respectively—were too 
late. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482) (ordering the federal judiciary to experiment with 
a set of case management techniques); FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1993) 
(enlarging the trial court’s case management authority); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory com-
mittee’s note (1993) (according district judges broader discretion to manage discovery); FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (1993) (making the discovery-planning confer-
ence a mandatory event); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note (1993) (noting 
that the purpose of the amendment was “to recognize the affirmative duty of the court to ex-
ercise the authority conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only 
fairly, but also without undue cost or delay”). See generally Gensler, supra note 135, at 677. 
With respect to the notion of a lag, there is no question that some judges resisted at least 
some of the case management reforms. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF 
JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT, at xxi (1996) (noting 
that some of the pilot districts were less enthusiastic about experimentation and implementa-
tion); Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 
49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 235–39 (1997) (noting the RAND Report’s findings that the federal 
judges implementing the CJRA were not always committed to the enterprise). The judiciary 
even campaigned against the CJRA. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm 
Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 
1190 (1996). Yet “[i]n its Final Report to Congress on the CJRA, the Judicial Conference 
endorsed early case management as provided in Rule 16, saying that ‘[t]he federal judiciary 
is committed to, and believes in, sound case management to reduce unnecessary cost and 
delay in civil litigation.” Gensler, supra note 135, at 680 (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: FINAL REPORT 10 (1997)). 
155  See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judg-
ment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judg-
ment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 685 (2013); Galanter, supra note 13, at 461; Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to 
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 
(2010); Young, supra note 13. 
156  See supra Part III. 
157  See supra Figure 10. 
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federal system approximated the number of trials held in 1962.158 And the ab-
solute number of trials has dropped in half again since 1997, such that the 
number of trials across the federal system in 2013 is substantially fewer even 
than the number of trials held in 1940, at the dawn of the modern era of federal 
courts.159 
But let us instead look at trials from the perspective of a judge’s civil case-
load in an average month. In 1947, the average judge tried 1.7 civil cases per 
month. Nearly forty years later, in 1985, the average judge still tried 1.7 civil 
cases per month. Accordingly, even during the long decade from 1969 to 1983, 
when the average judge’s caseload doubled, judges still tried the same (abso-
lute) number of cases.160 Throughout the period from 1947 to 1985, the mean 
and median number of civil trials per judge per month was 1.7, with a standard 
deviation of 0.14. Indeed, in 1985, one might even have mistaken the number 
of civil trials per judge per month as a procedural constant. 
FIGURE 11: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CIVIL TRIALS PER JUDGE PER MONTH161 
Since 1985, the number of civil trials has been in free fall: it dropped to 1.1 
trials per month in 1990, to 0.8 in 1995, to 0.7 in 2000, to 0.4 in 2005, to 0.4 in 
2010, and finally, to 0.3 in 2013.162 On average, contemporary judges preside 
over a civil trial approximately once every three months. 
The judiciary’s commitment to trials faded in 1985 after the caseload crisis 
had already abated. Put another way, the 1985 judge did everything that her 
1969 counterpart did, including trials, plus more. But because trials have van-
ished, the same cannot be said of the contemporary judge vis-à-vis her 1969 
counterpart. In lieu of trials, and because of case management mandates, the 
contemporary judge is inserting herself into a substantial number of cases that 
would otherwise settle even without court action. 
                
158 See supra note 149. 
159 See supra note 149. 
160 The definition of a trial is “a contested proceeding where evidence is introduced.” See 
supra note 103. 
161 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1947–2013). 
162 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23. 
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CONCLUSION: A FIFTH ERA? 
The judiciary’s aversion to delay, combined with substantial increases in 
the civil caseload, led to the activation of motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment (and complementary reforms) that, in turn, led to the termi-
nation of cases at earlier stages of litigation. Case management reforms, also 
wrought from concerns about delay, have made matters worse. 
This situation is problematic. The important resource that the judiciary 
provides is a forum for the integration of law and fact.163 When the parties set-
tle a case prior to trial or when a judge terminates a case prior to a trial, the 
process of integrating law and fact is truncated. When this process is abbreviat-
ed systematically, the mandate of substantive law is compromised; false nega-
tives and, to a lesser extent, false positives, surely follow.164 Trials, in particu-
lar, are the paradigmatic integration of law and fact.165 Importantly, when trials 
vanish, the shadow of trials also vanish.166 The shadow of a trial is critical for 
parties engaged in settlement negotiations: if trial is not a realistic alternative to 
a negotiated settlement, the only realistic alternative is a motion terminating the 
case. 
So where might we go from here? In a perfect world, judges would be put 
to their highest and best use, to-wit, presiding over trials. But of course the pro-
cedural constants warn against trials since cases that are tried linger on the 
dockets an average of twenty-four months. That is three times longer than the 
median time-to-termination that the judiciary has maintained for at least the 
past fifty years. 
For a model of a procedural system where judges tried cases yet also main-
tained the procedural constants, we need only revisit the third era. In the third 
era, motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment were exceptional 
events. Instead of hearing dispositive motions or trying to settle cases, judges 
managed cases for trial, and tried about 1.7 civil cases per month. Most cases 
settled—and 50 percent of all cases settled without and before any court action 
at all. But is it realistic to imagine a return to a third era approach to contempo-
rary caseloads? 
Eliminating aggressive case management would be the starting point. In-
deed, it appears to be the broad institutionalization of case management, not the 
ever-expanding caseload, that caused judges to abandon their long-established 
practice of presiding over 1.7 civil trials per month. Reducing judicial involve-
ment in the substantial percentage of cases that would terminate even without 
that involvement would give contemporary judges more time to perform other 
judicial tasks, hopefully trials. This suggestion is consistent with rigorous em-
                                                        
163  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
164  For the significant disadvantage to plaintiffs, in particular, see Moore, supra note 37, at 
1181, 1206. 
165  See supra note 55. 
166  For the importance of this metaphor, see supra note 19. 
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pirical data that proves scheduling conferences, settlement conferences, discov-
ery conferences, and more robust pretrial conferences do not prevent delays 
and, moreover, tend to increase the overall expense of litigation.167 As this em-
pirical study suggested (and as judges will attest),168 the only case management 
techniques that actually save money and time are firm discovery cut-offs and 
firm trial dates.169 Case management of this latter sort does not require a sub-
stantial investment of judicial time.170 
The next step would be to return motions to dismiss and motions for sum-
mary judgment to their shallow graves.171 The transformation of summary 
judgment into the “focal point” of litigation is arguably unconstitutional and is 
undoubtedly unfair to certain plaintiffs.172 But even more to the point of this 
article, it is also inefficient: it diverts an enormous amount of judicial resources 
from other tasks, and adds to the cost of litigation.173 Simply put, rather than 
putting resources into a motion for summary judgment that is a prediction about 
a hypothetical trial, we should simply schedule the trial.174 The same criticism 
and prescription applies to the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
which is the “new summary judgment.”175 Motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment are needed only for exceptional cases.176 In ordinary cases, 
the promise of a trial offers a meaningful integration of law and fact that leads 
either to a truly voluntary settlement or to a trial. 
The problem, however, is that contemporary judges have a heavier civil 
caseload than their third era counterparts. In 1969, judges terminated an aver-
age of fifteen cases per month. In 2013, judges terminated an average of twen-
ty-four cases per month. This is fewer than the thirty cases per month that judg-
es terminated in 1985, but it is still significantly higher than the 1969 caseload. 
But as Table B illustrates below, the important difference is not the in-
crease in the total number of terminations; the better measure of judicial work-
load is the increase in the number of cases receiving court attention. In this ta-
ble I have included three columns—the first, as a reference point, 
demonstrating again the consequences of a third era approach; the second col-
                                                        
167  JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL 
CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 14 (1996). 
168  Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under 
Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010). 
169  KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 154, at 91. 
170  For a discussion of the very different meanings of the term case management, see Steven 
S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 849, 855 
(2013). 
171  Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1851. 
172  Id. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. 
175  Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36 
OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 231, 250 (2011). 
176  See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1851 n.65. 
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umn depicts actual figures from Fiscal Year 2013; and the third column is a 
projection about how a third era approach might affect 2013 data. 
TABLE B: TERMINATIONS BY STAGE (AVG. MONTH)177 
 1969 
2013 
(Act.) 
2013 
(Proj.) 
Terminated Without any Court Action 7 (47%) 5 (22%) 12 
Terminated Before a Pretrial Conference 3 (23%) 16 (65%) 6 
Terminated at or After the Pretrial 3 (18%) 3 (12%) 4 
Terminated at Trial 2 (12%) 0 (1%) 2 
Total 15 24 24 
In 2013, there was court action in nineteen of twenty-four cases. Based up-
on decades of experience in the courts prior to the implementation of aggres-
sive case management, the elimination of case management could drop the 
number of cases requiring court attention to twelve cases per month.178 And 
based upon decades of experience in the courts prior to the invigoration of mo-
tions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, by simply managing the 
remaining cases for trial, most would settle and two would be tried.179 
To be sure, even the twelve cases requiring court attention in the projected 
2013 data is substantially more than the eight cases requiring court attention in 
1969. The creation of additional judgeships would solve the problem. But the 
expense and controversy associated with such an effort is unnecessary, at least 
as a first step. Contemporary judges have a team of magistrate judges, senior 
judges, and law clerks wholly unknown to their 1969 counterparts.180 This sup-
port team was institutionalized and expanded during the fourth era, and these 
adjuncts have been assigned responsibilities to complement a fourth era ap-
proach to dispute resolution.181 A repurposing of this team may be all that is 
necessary to transition toward a fifth era where, like the third era, cases are 
managed for trial, judges try cases, and almost all cases settle. 
                                                        
177  See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 23, at tbl.C-5 (1969 & 2013). 
178  See supra Table B. 
179  See supra Table B. 
180  See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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